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Cm:MINAL LA.w-APPLICATION OF MUBDBR-FELoNY Docnmra WHBRB
HoMICIDE WAs THE Aar OF A NoN-PARTICIPANT IN" THE FELONY-The appellant
and another entered a filling station for the purpose of committing an armed
robbery, held up those present, and then separated in search of money after the
owner had refused to disclose its location. The unarmed deceased, a friend of
the owner, attacked the appellant in an effort to frustrate the robbery. A brief
struggle followed during which the deceased obtained possession of the appellant's pistol and struck appellant on the head with it, thereby causing the
accidental discharge of the bullet which killed him. The appellant was convicted of murder. On appeal, held, affirmed. The alleged fact that the deceased
shot himself during a scuffle after wresting the gun from the appellant was no
defense. The appellant's act set in motion the cause which occasioned the death
of the deceased; therefore his felonious act was the proximate cause of the
homicide. Miers 11. State, (Tex. Crim. App. 1952) 251 S.W. (2d) 404.
It is firmly established that an accidental killing committed by a person in
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony, the natural and probable
consequence of which is homicide, is murder both at common law and under
statutes,1 without any requirement of a precedent malice or intention to cause
death.2 The asserted rationale for this result is that because such a felony is
motivated by malice the essential element of murder is present when an unintended killing is directly caused by the felonious actor. It is less certain, though,
whether a person will be held guilty of a murder where a homicide results from
the act of one resisting the felony. 8 The available judicial authority illustrates
several possible approaches but recent authority indicates a definite trend. The
early cases were determined on the narrow, inBexible premise that one could not
be guilty of murder unless the act was done by his own hand, or by someone
acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a common object. Of course,
1 For a study of the various types of statutes and their effect on the common law
murder-felony rule, see 63 L.R.A. 354 at 357 (1904).
2 See 40 C.J.S., Homicide §21 (1944); 63 L.R.A. 354 at 358 (1904). For a discussion
of whether the homicide was committed in the ''perpetration of a felony'' when it takes place
after the felony itself has been technically completed, see WBAll.TON, I.Aw OP HoMicml!,
3d ed., 186 (1907).
a For a recent discussion of the cases in this area, see 12 A.L.R. (2d) 210 (1950).
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such a limitation negated liability where the act of killing was done by a person
opposing the criminal act.4 This strict view was given application in a case where
a bystander was killed by a shot fired at the accused by one he was attempting
to rob.5 Peculiar statutory language may likewise produce the same result 6 The
historic case of Taylor v. State,1 the first to impose liability in this situation, held
that if the defendant, while engaged in the commission of a train robbery, compelled the victim of the homicide to occupy a place of danger to aid in consummating the felonious purpose, then such compulsion may be regarded as the
proximate cause of the death, even though the fatal shot was fired by a passenger. 8 A final sequence in the development has been the application of the tort
theory of proximate cause,9 the premise being that where the homicide is the
result of a force intervening between the death and the act of committing or
attempting to commit a felony, then such act itself will be deemed the proximate
cause of the death, if the intervening force was a natural and foreseeable result
of the initial criminal action. However, the court in Commonwealth v. Almeida10
actually relies on the defendant's act of opening fire on the policeman as the
proximate cause, i.e., the reasonably foreseeable consequence of this act was the
forcible opposition by officers, rather than the initial felonious act itself.11 The
principal case represents an unqualified application of the prevailing tort theory
of prqximate cause in a criminal prosecution and completes the cycle by imposing
liability where the victim of the homicide was not compelled to occupy a position
4Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705 (1863); Butler v.
People, 125 ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888); Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W.
1085 (1905). This view as expressed in Commonwealth v. Campbell, is explained as
dictum in Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596 at 622, 68 A. (2d) 595 (1949).
5 Commonwealth v. Moore, note 4 supra. In a discussion of the causal relation between
the act and the death, CLARK AND MAnsRALL, CRIMBs, 5th ed., §236 (1952), in reference
to the cases cited in note 4 supra, state: ''These decisions seem unsupportable, as the result,
as well as the intervening defensive acts, is foreseeable and probable."
6 A statute providing for the application of the murder-felony rule where the killing
was committed by a person engaged in the commission or attempt to commit a felony, may
be determinative of the issue. See People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930).
7 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900). See also, Keaton v. State, 41 Tex._ Crim.
621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900). For a more recent case, see Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68
S.W. (2d) 100 (1934), where the victim was killed by an officer's bullet while being held
as a shield to effectuate an escape. However, the court gave recognition and approval to
the principal and result of the cases cited in note 4 supra. Cf. Commonwealth v. Mellor,
294 Pa. 339, 144 A. 534 (1928); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 184 A. 97
(1936).
s However, the court explicitly denied liability in the event the victim went voluntarily
to the place where he received the fatal injury.
9 See Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A. (2d) 736 (1947), where defendant held guilty of murder even though the death bullet was fired by the gasoline station
owner during an exchange of shots in the course of an attempt to rob the station. To the
same effect, see Commonwealth v. Almeida, note 4 supra, where fatal bullet was fired by an
officer during an exchange of shots in an effort to prevent an attempted escape.
10 362 Pa. 596, 68 A. (2d) 595 (1949).
11 Id. at 621, 624, 633, 634, where Maxey, C.J., in an exhaustive opinion, talks in
terms of the felon firing the initial shot, or opening fire. However, there is no indication of
such a limitation in Commonwealth v. Moyer, note 9 supra. See People v. Podolski, 332
Mich. 508, 52 N.W. (2d) 201 (1952), where liability was imposed on the clear ground
that the very act of perpetrating the felony was the proximate cause of the homicide.
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of danger, and no shots were fired by the felon to provoke forcible opposition.
Of course, the killing as it actually occurred, as distinguished from the intervening resisting force, could not be deemed a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
the appellant's act.12 It seems clear that a homicide unrelated to the felonious
act, would fall outside the scope of the rule of the principal case, but in what
other situations there will be no liability is merely a matter of professional
speculation.13
Edgar A. Strause, S.Ed.

12 See dissenting opinion in Co=onwealth v. Almeida, note 4 supra, at 643, 644,
where the following charge to the jury was suggested: " ••. that the conduct of the
defendant . . • set in motion a chain of events among whose reasonably foreseeable consequences was a killing such as actually occurred."
13 See Co=onwealth v. Almeida, note 4 supra, at 625, where in reference to the
famous Lindbergh kidnapping case, State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809
(1935), the court hypothesized liability in the event the ladder which Hauptmann was
descending broke as a watchman grappled with him, causing the child to fall to the ground
and be killed.

